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TWENTY YEARS OF WEST VIRGINIA MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE LAW
CLYDE L. COLSON*
LMOST twenty years have passed since the publication of aAseries of articles dealing with the substantive law of marriage'
and divorce2 in West Virginia. Most of the marriage and divorce
cases decided during this time involve no more than the application
of already well-established principles. Such cases will not be dis-
cussed in this article. There have been enough new developments
in the field, however, both by legislation and by court decision, to
make worthwhile this effort to bring the articles up to date.
I. MARRIAGE
1. Formal Requisites
Probably the most important development in the marriage law
of this state was the decision in Kisla v. KislaA In that case the
marriage, by formal religious ceremony, was performed in West
Virginia under a license issued in Pennsylvania. The court held
the marriage void ab initio, thus establishing the proposition that
in order to have a valid marriage not only must there be a formal
religious ceremony, as had already been held, but such ceremony
must also be performed under a license issued in this state. In the
former article it was argued at some length that should the question
ever arise the court ought to hold the license requirement of our
statute to be directory only.4 In light of later changes in our statute
with respect to the issuance of marriage licenses, however, the
holding in the Kisla case that the license requirement is mandatory
is no doubt a sound one. The statutory changes referred to are
the 1937 requirement of a three-day waiting period after applica-
tion for the license before it may be issued, and the 1939 provision
that no license may be issued unless each of the parties to be married
has satisfactorily passed a standard serological test for syphilis.5 The
obviously desirable objectives of these new requirements could be
defeated entirely if our court had adopted the rule that a marriage
without a license is nevertheless valid.
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
. Colson, West Virginia Marriage Law, 43 W. VA. L.Q. 33 (1936).
2 Colson, West Virginia Divorce Law, 43 W. VA. L.Q. 120, 203, and 298 (1937)
3 124 W. Va. 220, 19 S.E.2d 609 (1942).
4 Colson, West Virginia Marriage Law, 43 W. VA. L.Q. 33, 36-40 (1936).
5 W. VA. CODE c. 48, art. 1, §§ 6 to 6d (Michie 1955).
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In its decision the court was careful to point out that it was
dealing only with the question of the necessity of a license, and
that it was not passing upon the validity of a marriage performed
under a defective license:
". ... In the case before us no effort was made to comply
with the statutory provisions relating to marriage licenses;
hence, there is no question herein involving a defective
license." 6
In thus leaving open the question of the effect of marriages under
defective licenses, the court is still free to hold valid a marriage
performed under a West Virginia license issued in the wrong
county or one improperly issued to a minor without the necessary
parental consent. In view of the large number of such defective
licenses, it is still confidently believed that whenever the question
is presented our court will sustain the validity of marriages per-
formed under such licenses.
2. Annulment
The case of Allen v. Allen7 contains a good discussion of fraud
as a ground for annulment, by clear implication under our statute
as well as under general equity principles. After emphasizing that
to justify annulment of the marriage contract the fraud must have
been perpetrated at or before the marriage and must have been
calculated to induce consent to the marriage, the court stated that
a secret intent on the part of one party to refrain permanently
from engaging in normal sexual intercourse would constitute such
fraud as would vitiate the marriage. In the particular case, how-
ever, it was held that such intent was not clearly established.
In Cole v. Compensation Commissioner, the court reaffirmed
its questionable position that although under our statute a wholly
bigamous marriage is voidable only, and may not be treated as void
until it has been annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, the
marriage of a divorced person during the prohibited period for
remarriage following the divorce is absolutely void and is therefore
subject to collateral attack. In refusing to overrule two former
cases to the same effect,9 decided in 1930 and 1933, the court with
some justification argued that its former position had received
legislative approval when the pertinent section of the statute was
amended in 1935:
6 Kisla v. Kisla, 124 W. Va. 220, 222, 19 S.E.2d 609 (1942).
7 126 W. Va. 415, 28 S.E.2d 829 (1944).
8 121 W. Va. 111, 1 S.E.2d 877 (1959).
9 Hall v. Baylous, 109 W. Va. 1, 153 S.E. 293 (1930); McManus v. Compensa.
tion Commissioner, 113 W. Va. 566, 169 S.E. 172 (1933).
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... Moreover, the action of the legislature reducing the
statutory period from six months to sixty days and the time
within which the trial court can prohibit the guilty party
from remarrying from five years to one year, withopt qualify-
ing in the least the word 'void', contained in the statute, after
that word had been defined in Hall v. Baylous, supra, and
McManus v. State Compensation Commissioner et al., supra,
is a legislative interpretation clearly evincing intent to render
null and of no effect all marriages attempted to be contracted
within the prescribed time. With deference, we feel con-
strained not to accept the distinction suggested by Judge
Maxwell in his able dissent to the opinion in Hall v. Baylous,
supra. Here, claimant, having subjected herself to the juris-
diction of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County in her divorce
suit, voluntarily has acquired a judicial status which, in our
opinion, ties her more solemnly and effectively than she would
be had she never been divorced and had entered into a
bigamous marriage as claimant did in Sledd v. State Compen-
sation Commissioner, supra."'
1
Although in these three cases, the only ones decided on this point,
the marriage occurred during the period when by the statute both
parties were prohibited from marrying, it is assumed, though this
has not yet been decided, that the same rule would be applicable to
a marriage by the guilty party during the additional period in
which by the divorce decree his remarriage may have been pro-
hibited by the court.
Attention should be called to the fact that in the light of recent
United States Supreme Court decisions, particularly those involving
segregation, the West Virginia statutes prohibiting marriages be-
tween white persons and negroes and providing for the annulment
of such marriagesl are to say the least of doubtful constitutionality.' 2
Shamblin v. Compensation Commissioner3 involved an in.
teresting question concerning the effect of an annulment. A widow
who was receiving compensation for the death of her former hus-
band innocently contracted a bigamous marriage with a man who
at the time had two wives living and undivorced. Payment of
compensation was discontinued on the date of her second marriage.
Upon discovery of the facts, she instituted suit to annul the biga-
mous marriage and was granted a decree of annulment six months
later. The compensation commissioner reinstated her as a recipient
10 Cole v. Compensation Commissioner, 121 W. Va. 111, 114, 1 S.E.2d 877
(1939).11 W. VA. CoDE c. 48, art. 1, § 19, and c. 48, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1955).
12 Editorial Note, The Constitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes, I HowARD
L.J. 87 (1955).
13122 W. Va. 652, 12 S.E.2d 527 (1940).
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of compensation as of the date of the annulment decree, but denied
her claim to compensation during the period of six months after
the marriage and before its annulment. An order of the Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board sustaining the action of the commis-
sioner was reversed on appeal, the court holding that she was en-
titled to compensation during the six-month period because by
lelation back the annulment decree made the marriage a nullity
from the beginning.
The question of the jurisdiction of our courts to annul mar-
riages by residents of this state who marry in another state to evade
our laws was raised in Bell v. Bell.1 " In that case after the parties
had been married in Maryland to evade compliance with our
statutes concerning marriages under the age of consent, they re-
turned to West Virginia, but did not live together in this state as
man and wife. The statute governing the case provided that
"If any person resident in this State shall, in order to evade
the law, and with an intention of returning to reside in this
State, go into another state or country, and there intermarry
in violation of the provisions of section one, article two of this
chapter, and shall afterwards 'return and reside here, cohabit-
ing as man and wife, such marriage shall be governed by the
same law, in all respects, as if it had been solemnized in this
State." 5
It was properly held, as a matter of statutory construction, that the
jurisdiction of our courts to annul marriages contracted outside
the state in order to evade our law was limited to cases in which the
parties after returning to this state establish a marital domicile here
and live together as husband and wife. Recognizing the fact that
in the case of many such runaway marriages no marital domicile
is ever established in this state, the legislature in 1941, after the
decision in the Bell case, amended the statute by deleting the phrase
"cohabiting as man and wife". As a consequence, under the present
statute0 our courts have jurisdiction to annul marriages contracted
by West Virginians in other states in evasion of our law, if after
the marriage they return and reside here, regardless of whether they
establish a marital domicile in this state.
1& 122 W. Va. 223, 8 S.E.2d 183 (1940.
:15W. VA. REv. CODE c. 48, art. 1, § 17 (1931).
1W. VA. R.-v. CoDr c. 48, art. 1, § 17 (Michie 1955).
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [1956], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol58/iss2/3
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAW
II. DIvoRcE
1. Jurisdiction, Venue and Procedure
It will be recalled that when the code was revised in 1931 the
legislature established exceedingly strict jurisdictional requirements
that must be met before our courts may grant a divorce. The ob-
vious purpose of these requirements, which were discussed in detail
in a former article,17 was to discourage the development of a divorce
racket in this state by making it very difficult, though not impossible,
for a nonresident to establish a domicile here for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce. The case of Taylor v. Taylor'8 contains a
valuable discussion of domicile and residence in divorce cases and
also raises some interesting possibilities as to an easy method of
getting around our strict jurisdictional requirements.
In the Taylor case the plaintiff husband and his wife main-
tained their marital domicile in Mercer County in this state until
December 1940. They then established a domicile in the District
of Columbia, thus as the court held ceasing to be residents of this
state within the meaning of our divorce statutes.1 9 Neither party
returned to West Virginia until their separation, after which the
plaintiff again established his domicile in Mercer County in Feb-
ruary 1944. Note that although both parties were former residents,
the court attached no importance to this fact and presumably the
decision would have been the same had neither party been a resi-
dent of the state until the husband's return in 1944. Only a few
weeks after his return the plaintiff instituted a suit for divorce
against his nonresident wife on the ground of adultery. There was
some conflict in the evidence on the question whether the wife was
personally served with process in this state, but however that may
be she made a general appearance and filed a cross bill for divorce
from the plaintiff on the grounds of habitual drunkenness and
cruelty. It is important to note that all of the acts alleged by both
parties as grounds for divorce occurred while they were both non-
residents. On this point the court quite properly held that the
general appearance by the wife satisfied the requirement of personal
service, thus making inapplicable the following requirement of
our statute:
"Provided, however, that in any case in which the defend-
ant cannot be personally served with process within this State,
17 Colson, West Virginia Divorce Law, 43 W. VA. L.Q. 120, 120-122 (1937).
18 128 W. Va. 198, 36 S.E.2d 601 (1945).
19 For another case in accord see Sutton v. Sutton, 128 W. Va. 290, 36 S.E.2d
608 (1945).
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such suit shall not be maintainable unless the plaintiff at the
time the cause of action arose was an actual bona-fide resident
of this State and has been such a resident for at least one year
next preceding the commencement of suit, or that since the
cause of action arose has become such a resident and has con-
tinued so to be for at least two years next preceding the com-
mencement of suit."20
If the court had held otherwise on the question whether the require-
ment concerning personal service had been satisfied, it would then
have been necessary for the plaintiff to satisfy a two-year residence
requirement, the cause of action having arisen while he was a non-
resident, before a court in this state would have had jurisdiction of
his suit for divorce on any ground.21
Remember that when the ground for divorce is adultery no
specified period of residence in this state is necessary if the court
has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the only requirement
being that the plaintiff be a domiciled resident at the time he in-
stitutes the suit. After the defendant filed her cross bill in the
principal case, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the cross bill on the
ground that the court lacked jurisdiction of the case, and at the
hearing on the motion he testified, contrary to the allegation in
his original bill, that he was not a resident of the state when he
started the suit. The trial court found that he was a resident at
that time, held that it had jurisdiction, and overruled the motion.
The plaintiff then by leave of court dismissed his bill of complaint.
After a hearing on the merits of the defendant's cross bill, the court
granted her a divorce from the plaintiff. On appeal the court
affirmed the decree, two judges dissenting, over the strong objec-
tion of the plaintiff that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter
any judgment in the case, except an order of dismissal.
There can be no question as to the correctness of the court's
holding that the plaintiff was a domiciled resident at the time he
filed his original bill. The finding of the trial court against the
plaintiff on the question whether he had the necessary intent to
establish a domicile on his return to Mercer County, though based
on conflicting testimony, was properly sustained by the court be-
cause the finding was not clearly wrong or against the pre-
ponderance of the evidence. In its discussion of the law applicable
to these facts, the court said:
". ... It is to be noted that, under the statute, no definite
period of time is required to establish a legal residence. Like-
20 W. VA. CODE c. 48, art. 2, § 8 (Michie 1955).
21 Saunders v. Saunders, 129 W. Va. 180, 186, 39 S.E2d 647 (1946).
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wise, in the absence of any statutory regulation, no definite
period of residence or specified length of time in a particular
place is necessary to establish a domicile; but, when ac-
companied with the element of intent, any residence, how-
ever short, will be sufficient to establish a domicile, even if it
is but for a day."22
This being true, note that a person who had never before been in
this state could in one day establish his domicile here and could oil
the same day file a suit for divorce on the ground of adultery. Note
also that under our statute, as was properly held in this case, the
court would have full jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
In the principal case, however, the court never did hear the
suit for divorce on the ground of adultery because that suit, over
which the court clearly had jurisdiction, was voluntarily dismissed
by the plaintiff. Following the rule laid down in the earlier case
of Hale v. Hale,23 the court stated:
"The trial court having jurisdiction of the case, it was
within its power to hear and determine the merits and to
grant the defendant the relief prayed for in her answer and
cross bill, as it did, even though the defendant was not, at
the time of the trial, a bona fide resident of this State. The
court retained its jurisdiction for that purpose notwithstand-
ing the action of the plaintiff in dismissing his bill of com-
plaint, which he did, on his own motion and by leave of the
court, at the conclusion of the hearing of the motion to dis-
miss the case upon the ground that the court had no jurisdic-
tion to entertain it."24
It is submitted that the application of the principle of the Hale
case to the particular facts in the principal case is open to serious
question. Note that under this decision, contrary to the purpose
and spirit of the jurisdictional requirements of our divorce statutes,
on a cross bill filed by a nonresident defendant our courts have
jurisdiction to hear and determine divorce causes which could not
have been brought independently by the nonresident as a plaintiff
in an original action.
On the facts in the principal case, since neither of the grounds
for divorce alleged in the cross bill was adultery and since both
alleged causes of action arose when neither party was a resident
of this state, the nonresident wife could not as plaintiff have in-
stituted a suit for divorce against the husband after he became a
resident until he had resided here for a period of two years. There
22 Taylor v. Taylor, 128 W. Va. 198, 206, 36 S.E.2d 601 (1945).
23 104 W. Va. 254, 139 S.E. 754 (1927).
24 Taylor v. Taylor, 128 W. Va. 198, 211, 36 S.E.2d 601 (1945).
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would therefore seem to be real doubt as to the soundness of a rule
that would permit our court to take jurisdiction of these same causes
of action merely because they were contained in a cross bill filed in
a suit by the resident husband. If the husband had been a resident
of this state for two years before he filed his suit for divorce, and
the wife had then filed her same cross bill, no one would contend
that the husband by dismissing his own suit could thereby deprive
the court of jurisdiction to decide the issues raised by the defendant.
To that extent, the principle of the Hale case is sound enough.
This criticism of the rule has nothing to do with the plaintiff's
effort to deprive the court of jurisdiction by withdrawing his case.
The real objection is that the defendant in his cross bill is granted
relief on the basis of a cause of action over which our court would
otherwise have had no jurisdiction. It is submitted that the doc-
trine of the Hale case should be modified so as to prevent a non-
resident defendant from obtaining any affirmative relief on his cross
bill that he could not have obtained in an independent suit filed
by him as plaintiff. It is at least worthy of note that the Hale case
was decided in 1927, which was several years before the legislature
established our present strict jurisdictional requirements in divorce
cases.
Not only does the decision in the principal case run counter to
the policy of the legislature in laying down these strict requirements,
but it is feared that the decision may invite collusive action by the
parties to confer easy divorce jurisdiction on our courts. Note that
under the decision in this case West Virginia might easily become
a Mecca for those seeking quick divorces unless great care is taken
to prevent collusion. Suppose that a nonresident couple, neither
of whom has ever been in this state, should decide that they want a
West Virginia divorce. The only thing necessary would be for one
of them to move into the state with the avowed intention of making
this his permanent residence. If he testified to this effect, it would
be an exceedingly difficult matter to prove that he had no such
intent. Then without residing here for any stated period, and
even on the day he established his domicile here, he could file for
divorce on the ground of adultery. The nonresident could then
submit to the jurisdiction of the court and file a cross bill for
divorce on any ground recognized in this state. It would not even
be necessary for the plaintiff to introduce any evidence as to the
alleged adultery. Note that in the principal case the husband
introduced no evidence, having voluntarily withdrawn his suit.
As soon as the case could be matured, the court could proceed to
8
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grant a divorce on the cross bill without either party having satis-
fied any residence requirement other than the plaintiff's establish-
ment of a domicile here. It may be said that such a combination
of circumstances would in and of itself be evidence of collusion,
but admittedly the whole thing could be bona fide, as it apparently
was in the Taylor case, and the collusion, if any, would be hard to
prove. In order to avoid such a result it is submitted that our court
might do well to apply the same jurisdictional requirements to a
cause of action for divorce set forth in a cross bill as would be
applied to the same cause of action in an original suit.
As was stated in the Taylor case, and specifically held in
Anderson v. Anderson,25 if all other jurisdictional requirments are
satisfied the defendant by making a general appearance may waive
his right to question the court's jurisdiction of his person for lack
of proper service of process. In contrast to this rule, and contrary
to the general rule with respect to venue, it is important to note that
in divorce cases the defendant may not waive the venue require-
ments of our statute, which are treated in all respects as going to
the jurisdiction of the court and its competence to render a valid
decree. In a case in which Marion ounty was the county in which
the parties last cohabited and in ohich the defendant resided, and
was therefore the only county in which suit could properly be
brought, our court said:
"Plaintiff alleges that defendant having filed an answer
in the instant suit has given his consent to the establishment
of jurisdiction by the Circuit Court of Preston County. This
position is untenable. We are here concerned with the matri-
monial status of plaintiff and defendant, which is the subject
matter of this suit. Jurisdiction of the subject matter is not
conferred by consent."26
As to the validity and effect of a decree entered by a court
lacking jurisdiction so far as venue is concerned, the court said:
"The provisions of Code, 48-2-9, are mandatory and, in a
divorce proceeding wherein the defendant is a resident of
this State, facts showing compliance therewith must be alleged
in the bill of complaint in order to validate any action of the
court therein. Otherwise the proceeding is void in all re-
spects. 27
From this it would seem to follow that the decree, being void for
25 121 W. Va. 103, 1 S.E.2d 884 (1939). Accord, Smith v. Smith, 138 W. Va
388, 76 S.E.2d 253 (1953).
26 Hartman v. Hartman, 132 W. Va. 728, 736, 53 S.E.2d 407 (1949).
27 Morgan v. Vest, 125 W. Va. 367, syl., 24 S.E.2d 329 (1943).
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lack of jurisdiction, would be subject to collateral as well as direct
attack. This is not entirely clear, however, as witness the following
statement in a recent case:
"There being no direct attack upon the decree entered
by the Circuit Court of Ritchie County on October 9, 1944,
and the replication filed by the relator being, at most, a col-
lateral attack thereon, we cannot hold void the Ritchie County
decree. There is an intimation that this decree was obtained
through fraud, in that plaintiff therein was not a bona fide
resident of Ritchie County at the time he instituted his suit,
and, therefore, that court did not have jurisdiction; but there
is no satisfactory proof of that contention in the record before
us. We cannot hold void the decree of the circuit court where
the attack thereon is, at the most, collateral; nor could we do
so in a direct attack, without supporting proof."2 8
Compare the following from a later case:
"A decree entered in a divorce proceeding where the court
does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter is void, and
may be attacked collaterally or directly."29
It should be pointed out, however, that this later statement is not
directly in point because the court's lack of jurisdiction in the case
was placed on a different and rather startling ground. There is no
quarrel with the statement as such. Indeed, the result in the case
would not be open to serious question had the court's lack of juris-
diction been placed on the ground of the nonresidence of the parties,
which it would seem might well have been done. The court, how-
ever, specifically refused to consider this point:
"Further contentions are made to the effect that the
divorce decree entered in the Circuit Court of Nicholas County
is void for the reasons that both spouses were resident of and
domiciled in Florida for a period beginning before the insti-
tution of that suit and continued to be domiciled there until
after the entry of the decree; that they last cohabited as hus-
band and wife in Florida; and that the divorce decree was
obtained by fraud. We think it unnecessary to now con-
sider the merits of these questions, in so far as they relate to
that part of the decree granting the divorce, since that part
of the decree has been held to be void for another reason."2 0
The actual ground on which the court held the decree void for
lack of jurisdiction and hence subject to direct or collateral attack
.8 Suter v. Suter, 128 W. Va. 511, 518, 37 S.E.2d 474 (1946).
29 Bennett v. Bennett, 137 W. Va. 179, syl. 5, 70 S.E.2d 894 (1952).
ao Id. at 192.
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seems very doubtful, and possible applications of the decision are
most disturbing. In 1949 the husband brought suit in this state,
in the Circuit Court of Nicholas County, for a divorce on the
ground of cruelty. He alleged in his complaint the conduct of the
wife which he claimed amounted to cruelty. The wife made a
general appearance. The commissioner in chancery to whom the
case was referred found that the wife was guilty of cruelty. In May
1950 the circuit court confirmed the report of the commissioner
and entered a decree granting the husband a divorce. The wife
did not appeal. Some years later she instituted the chancery suit
in the principal case, praying that the decree in the former divorce
suit be set aside and held void. As stated above, this relief might
well have been granted on the ground that the court lacked juris-
diction of the suit because the jurisdictional requirements of our
statute were not satisfied. This, however, the court refused to do,
choosing rather to hold the decree void on the ground that the al-
legations charging cruelty in the divorce suit did not state a cause
of action.
Until the decision in this case it was thought that nothing
could be clearer than the proposition that even if the trial court
did err in holding that the alleged acts constituted cruelty, the only
way to correct such an error would be by appeal. Certainly this
would be true in other areas of the law. Suppose, for example,
that in a suit for damages caused by the alleged negligence of the
defendant, a demurrer on the ground that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action should be erroneously overruled. Suppose
further that after trial judgment should go against the defendant,
without an appeal being taken. In a separate suit brought some
years later to set aside the judgment on the ground that the com-
plaint failed to state a cause of action, assuredly our court would
not hold the judgment void because of the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction in the former case. To do so would violate every prin-
ciple involved in the doctrine of res judicata. Yet that is exactly
what the court did in the principal case, and this on the ground that
the lack of jurisdiction appeared on the face of the record by reason
of the plaintiff's failure to allege a good ground for divorce. Of
course this would have been true if, for instance, the alleged ground
had been insanity which is not a ground for divorce at all in this
state. The difference here is that the defendant did allege a good
ground for divorce, to wit, cruelty, and merely failed to allege
facts which in the opinion of the upper court amounted to cruelty,
11
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though the trial court was of a contrary opinion. If the principal
case is good law, query how much confidence may be placed in
many unappealed divorces granted by our circuit courts.
Before leaving the question of jurisdiction and venue, attention
should be called to a 1953 amendment of our statute. Before 1958
if the defendant was a resident of this state a suit for annulment or
a suit for divorce could be brought either in the county in which
the parties last cohabited or in the county where the defendant
resided, but if the defendant was a nonresident, suit could be
brought only in the county where the plaintiff resided. The 1958
amendment permits such a suit, when the defendant is a non-
resident to be brought either in the county where the plaintiff resides
or in the county in which the parties last cohabited. 31
In a former article attention was called to the fact that, because
of a supposed ambiguity in our statutes concerning the duties of
divorce commissioners and of commissioners in chancery in divorce
cases, some circuit courts had been allowing the divorce commis-
sioner to act in both capacities. 32  This practice was specifically
condemned by our court, as follows:
"Code 48-2-26 provides that the circuit court, instead of
trying a divorce suit in chambers, may refer the cause 'to
one of the commissioners in chancery of such court, or to a
special commissioner, who shall take and return the testimony
in such cause, together with a report of all such facts as the
commissioner may be able to obtain', etc. It has been the
practice in some circuits to make this reference to the divorce
commissioner. This practice is referred to in the Revisers'
Note to 48-2-24 with the comment that while the statute pos-
sibly admits such construction, the Revisers thought the statute
was not so intended. 48-2-24 particularizes the duties of the
divorce commissioner as follows: '. . . . to investigate all di-
vorce suits; to appear at all trials and examine witnesses when
necessary, and defend the interests of the State; to bring before
the court, at the trial, all witnesses necessary to develop the
true facts and generally take all necessary steps to prevent
fraud and collusion in divorce suits.' This statute recognizes
the State as a party, though a silent party, to every divorce
suit, and makes a divorce commissioner the special representa-
tive of the State. 48-2-26 makes the commissioner in chancery,
to whom a cause is referred, the impartial representative of
the circuit court. Thus the two positions are incompatible,
and reference under 48-2-26 should not be made to a divorce
commissioner." 3
1 W. VA. CODE c. 48, art. 2, § 9 (Michie 1955).
'2 Colson, West Virginia Divorce Law, 43 W. VA. L.Q. 120, 125-126, (1987).
's McCormick v. McCormick, 118 W. Va. 568, 569, 191 S.E. 207 (1937).
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In 1945 an important change was made concerning the duties
of a commissioner in chancery to whom a case is referred. Before
1945 the divorce commissioner could do no more than report his
findings of fact to the court, but under the 1945 amendment it be-
came his duty to report his findings of fact, "together with his recom-
mendation concerning whether a divorce, annulment or affirmation,
as the case may be, should be granted, and concerning any other
matter on which the court may request his recommendation." 34
Another important change in the procedure in divorce cases
occurred as the result of the decision in State ex rel. Watson v.
Rodgers.35 Prior to this decision it had been the practice in many
counties to permit the parties by consent to waive maturity of
divorce cases at rules. Warrant for this practice, permissible in
other equity cases, was found in the provision of our statute that
divorce suits "shall be instituted and conducted as other chancery
suits, except as provided in this article." 38 In the Rodgers case,
much to the surprise of many members of the bar, it was held that
the divorce article did provide otherwise, as follows:
"Suit for divorce or annulment shall mature the same as
other cases in chancery, and when properly matured the case
shall be placed on the docket for trial... ,,37
It was held that under this provision the parties could not consent
to waive maturity of the case at rules. In order to validate decrees
previously entered in cases in which maturity at rules had been
waived, the legislature in 1947 provided that all such decrees should
be recognized as valid unless before July 1, 1947 proper steps
were taken to have the decrees set aside.38 There has been no case
involving the validity of this curative statute.
Another matter of procedure about which there had apparently
been some difference of opinion was expressly covered in another
statutory amendment in 1947:
"An infant plaintiff or defendant in any divorce or annul-
ment suit shall appear, answer, demur or plead by a next
friend, and no guardian ad litem shall be required unless
specifically ordered by the court or the judge hearing the
cause." 39
34 W. VA. COD c. 48, art. 2, § 26 (Michie 1955).
35 129 W. Va. 174, 89 S.E.2d 268 (1946).
36 W. VA. CODE c. 48, art. 2, § 11 (Michie 1955).
371d. § 23.
3 Id. § 31.
39 Id. § la.
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2. Grounds for Divorce
(a) Adultery. The only important development in our law
with respect to adultery as ground for divorce is found in the
clarification by the court of its rule concerning the degree of proof
necessary to establish adultery. It was mentioned in a former article
that our court has at various times laid down three different rules as
to the degree of proof required: (1) By preponderance of the evi-
dence, (2) by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) by evidence
that will admit of no other conclusion, which is at least the equiva-
lent of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.40 Although it was pointed
out that the second rule was the one laid down in by far the greater
number of cases, the conclusion was drawn that in its then most
recent decisions our court had adopted the third rule. In a series
of cases decided since then, the court appears definitely to have
returned to the second rule, which is the one followed in most states.
The following is a clear statement of the present position of the
court:
"The contention of the plaintiff that the evidence is not
sufficient to convict her of adultery as charged is wholly un-
tenable. The well established rule, uniformly recognized and
applied in the decisions of this Court, is that to warrant a
decree on the ground of adultery the burden rests upon the
complainant to make out his case by evidence which is suf-
ficiently clear, strong and convincing to carry conviction of
guilt to the judicial mind and that evidence which raises
only a strong suspicion of guilt is not sufficient." 41
(b) Desertion. The case of Hewitt v. Hewitt 42 settled a ques-
tion concerning the continuity of the period of desertion that had
been doubtful under previous decisions.4 There had been no clear
rule as to the effect of litigation between the parties on the required
desertion period. The Hewitt case clearly established the "time
out" rule, holding that the period prior to the litigation could be
tacked on to the period following the litigation to make up the re-
quired continuous period of desertion, it being necessary only that
the period during the pendency of the suit be deducted from the
total elapsed time from the date of the original desertion.
(c) Habitual Drunkenness. It was not until the case of Kessel
40 Colson, West Virginia Divorce Law, 48 W. VA. L.Q. 120, 129-132 (1937).
41 Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh, 136 W. Va. 708, 717, 68 S.E.2d 361 (1951).
Accord, Wolfe v. Wolfe, 120 W. Va. 389, 399, 198 S.E. 209 (1938); Smith v.
Smith, 125 W. Va. 489, 498, 24 S.E.2d 902 (1943); Witt v. Witt, 87 S.E.2d 524,
529-530 (W. Va. 1955).
42 120 W. Va. 151, 197 S.E. 297 (1938). See comment 45 W. VA. L.Q. 83 (1938).
43 Colson, West Virginia Divorce Law, 43 W. VA. L.Q. 203, 218-220 (1937).
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v. Kessel 4 that our court had occasion to make a specific definition
of habitual drunkenness as a ground for divorce under our statute.
In denying the divorce on the particular facts of the case, it was said:
"In a bill for divorce, where the bill alleges habitual
drunkenness as a ground therefor, proof that defendant occa-
sionally became intoxicated from drinking intoxicating liquors
does not establish the allegation of habitual drunkenness with-
in the meaning of Code 48-2-4, as amended by Chapter 35, Acts
of the Legislature, 1935; to sustain such charge it must appear
that the drunkenness has become a fixed habit, so frequently
indulged in as to show an inability to control the appetite




(a) Unclean Hands. In several recent cases the court correctly
applied its doctrine that a plaintiff otherwise entitled to a divorce
may be denied relief because of inequitable conduct on his part
that is a substantial contributing cause of the defendant's miscon-
duct.46 There would seem to be serious question, however, as to
the court's application of the unclean hands doctrine in Cottle v.
Cottle.4 The pertinent part of the opinion on this point is as
follows:
"We, however, are of the opinion that the moving of
furniture and personal effects from the home and establishing
an abode for herself and child elsewhere, does not entitle
defendant to a divorce, because defendant himself was guilty
of cruel and inhuman treatment, as heretofore stated, which
was not condoned; and in our opinion plaintiff was not
justified, without notice to defendant, in removing herself
and child from the home and establishing a separate abode
elsewhere. Her actions in this regard were such inequitable
conduct as would preclude her from a divorce.
48
In the first place, when the plaintiff left the defendant she had a
ground for divorce based on his cruelty. Therefore she was not
guilty of desertion because she was justified in leaving. In fact,
had she continued to live with the defendant she would have con-
doned his offense and thereby lost her right to a divorce. Hence
it is difficult to see how our court could hold that her action was
44 131 W. Va. 239, 46 S.E.2d 792 (1948).
4t5 Id., syl. 2.
46 Wolfe v. Wolfe, 120 W. Va. 389, 400, 198 S.E. 209 (1938); Smith v. Smith,
125 W. Va. 489, 499, 24 S.E.2d 902 (1943); Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh, 136 W. Va.
708, 716-717, 68 S.E.2d 361 (1951).
47 129 W. Va. 344, 40 S.E.2d 863 (1946).
48 Id. at 357.
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such inequitable conduct as to bar her right to a divorce. Further-
more, even if it had been inequitable conduct, it had no causal
relation whatever to the defendant's cruelty, and hence did not
come within the unclean hands doctrine as consistently applied by
our court in other cases.
(b) Collusion. The case of McNinch v. McNinch49 contains an
interesting discussion of collusion and the responsibilities of th.
divorce commissioner with respect thereto. In that case the plain-
tiff charged his wife with adultery. She filed an answer in the
nature of a cross bill, denying the charge and asking for a divorce
from the plaintiff on the ground of cruelty. Her counsel then filed
her sworn written statement that she agreed with the plaintiff not
to defend the case in consideration that the custody of their child
be granted her by the court during each summer. After filing this
affidavit her counsel withdrew from the case. Without more, the
court proceeded to hear the plaintiff's evidence and entered a
decree granting him a divorce. This was reversed on appeal, the
court holding that the facts were sufficient to put the court on notice
of probable collusion between the parties, and that the court should
not have heard the case until there had been a full and complete
investigation by the divorce commissioner on the question of
collusion. As was said by the court:
"..... The office of divorce commissioner was created for
the purpose, as disclosed by the terms of the statute, of pre-.
venting imposition upon the public and those directly in-
terested in divorce proceedings. The commissioner, therefore,
should have voluntarily stepped into the breach in this case,
and upon his neglect to do so, the court should have called
upon him to act." 50
The court might well have pointed out that the trial chancellor
himself is also charged with the responsibility of preventing collu-
sion in divorce cases, and that consequently the court should have
acted if the divorce commissioner did not.
(c) Condonation. In Miles v. Miles,51 contrary to what had
been thought to be the rule in this state, our court held that, except
in a case of adultery, voluntary sexual intercourse is not necessarily
condonation of an existing ground for divorce. In the particular
case, however, it was held that this circumstance plus other evidence
of forgiveness did amount to condonation.
49117 W. Va. 774, 188 S.E. 231 (1936).
5Old. at 776..
5- 131 W. Va. 513, 48 S.E.2d 669 (1948).
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